



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

What is the moral of all this? What can be done to help matters now or at the close of the war? Who knows what the conditions will be when the war is over? Are all the programs now being evolved worth the time and energy that is being given to their preparation? Can practical steps of probable ultimate value be taken under present conditions?

The one active question now within the range of vision is that of the increase of American armament, and that must be handled with gloves. The country shows every sign of having made up its mind to the need of increased military preparation, and the utmost that any opponent can hope to accomplish is to prevent its reaching extravagant proportions by convincing, if he can, that less will suffice. It will be to no purpose to employ the usual peace society method of attacking the whole plan and trying to shave the program down. There is this time to be met not a professional military demand, but the earnest sincere faith of the people that more

defense is needed, and glittering generalities as to the immunity of America will not serve. Its opponents will need, too, to avoid complications with partisans of the present belligerent nations, working in the interest of one nation or another, under whatever guise. Whatever action is taken—for or against increased armament—must be the free expression of Americans, working in the interest of America, and America only.

Aside from this question of our own present need for armament, immediate practical problems seem just now to be almost non-existent. We shall have them in abundance when the war is over, no doubt; but what they will then be is today on the knees of the gods, and today our chief mission is to stand fast by our fundamental principles, mark time, and wait. When the war is over the whole subject may present a totally new aspect. There may, for one thing, be fewer kings and kinglets to settle out of hand the destinies of their peoples.

## PEACE BY FORCE AND FEDERATION

By JAMES L. TRYON

THE most significant change in the American peace movement during the last year is the tendency of some of its most representative leaders to base it upon force. This is shown by the organization of the League to Enforce Peace. The scheme of William Ladd, the founder of the American Peace Society, provided for a court and congress of nations without sheriff or policeman. The great majority of the advocates of peace in the nineteenth century and even up to the present time have consciously or unconsciously followed in his footsteps. An arbitration tribunal, reference to which should be voluntary, or at most morally obligatory when pledged by treaty, the decisions of the court to be accepted in good faith by the litigants, was the plan of the Hague conferences as of the Interparliamentary Union. Advocates of the Court of Arbitral Justice, the most advanced ideal of an international court for questions arising in time of peace that has ever been officially approved by the nations, have usually urged an international judiciary without police and have considered Mr. Root's address on public opinion as the sanction of international law the best expression of their views on this subject.\* So the convention for the International Prize Court, a court of appeal in prize cases, arising in war, with a previously chosen personnel, somewhat similar to that of the Court of Arbitral Justice, and like it, projected at The Hague in 1907, depended upon the good faith of the litigants for the enforcement of decisions. Further, the cases that were tried in the nineteenth and at the opening of the twentieth century required no international coercion for the enforcement of decrees. The very fact that the society of nations hitherto has been a recognized collection of free and independent states, all upon an equality, utterly intolerant of the idea of an overlordship,

each state virtually a law unto itself, especially if it were a great military or naval state, and exceedingly jealous of its rights if a small state, made an atmosphere for arbitration. Arbitration is peculiarly a method for the adjudication of cases between states that theoretically are equals which generally choose their own judges and agree beforehand either expressly or impliedly to accept the award to be rendered.

But if voluntary and non-enforceable arbitration is appropriate to a loose relationship of independent states, a court with enforcement powers is suited to a union of only partially independent states when pure independence is sacrificed to interdependence in order to secure stability and protection under federal sovereignty. We should not expect to introduce the sanction of force without a corresponding advance in federation to make force, when collectively used, effective. That we have been making slow, almost imperceptible, progress towards world federation there can be no doubt, and that we are becoming confronted with the problems of federation is a situation that is difficult for some of us to realize. This evolution towards world federation, now in the stage of quasi-confederation, may be traced in the development of the administrative unions, of which the postal union may be taken as an example, the Hague court, upon which we are advancing, the Hague Conferences, the third of which is to be supplied with an order of parliamentary procedure, and the solution of international problems by conferences of groups of the powers over questions in China, Morocco, the Balkans, and Mexico, which, though marked by failures in some particulars, set precedents for united action. The present alliances in Europe, though now antagonistic, may also be instanced as steps towards ultimate unity. In the juridical organization of the world, in which we have made greatest progress through independent arbitral tribunals and the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, we have progressed to a point where if the

\* See *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1908, p. 451.

Court of Arbitral Justice and the International Prize Court are realized we may have a judicial union—another stage in the evolution towards federation.

Meantime we must not forget that there has always been a strongly enunciated minority opinion in favor of leagues of peace or confederations, or even federations with enforcement powers. Of such a nature were the schemes of Henry IV, William Penn, and the Abbé St. Pierre, in the earliest days of peace agitation and the proposal of the Czar Alexander for the confederation of Europe in Napoleonic times. The experiment of the Holy Alliance, which was due to Alexander and to some of his royal colleagues who at heart were more reactionary than he in the repressive uses to which they put international police when democracy was struggling to come to its own, had much to do with the discredit into which international military force, especially without legal limitations, has fallen. A most suggestive review of this whole question by a keen historical critic is found in Walter Alison Phillips' *Confederation of Europe*. For some time past international peace congresses had given attention to the sanctions of force, but hardly more than that. Mr. Bollack, in 1912, had urged the congress at Geneva to propose the adoption of a customs boycott, or an extra tariff to be levied on the goods of a recalcitrant state if it should refuse either to come to court or to comply with an arbitral decision. Professor Van Vollenhoven of Leyden University asked the congress at The Hague in the year following to recommend international police for the enforcement of conventions and treaties; but after debate both propositions were referred to committees for further study. Among the names of Americans who have favored international police are those of President Eliot and Edwin Ginn. With a political conception of the peace movement, Raymond L. Bridgman, in *World Organization* and later works, has persistently advocated a complete international government.

But whatever historical connection we may see between the present and past proposals of force or federation, the League to Enforce Peace is particularly the outgrowth of conditions brought about by the European war, which may be said to be the occasion, perhaps rather than the cause, of the movement in America in behalf of new sanctions, not however as a substitute for, but in addition to public opinion and good faith, for these the League itself would recognize as preferable if they will work.

The League does not pretend to offer a constitution of the United States of the world or even an elaborate statement of international measures. It simply puts forth a few general principles in a brief platform. Besides proposing a court for the trial of justiciable questions, a council of conciliation for non-justiciable questions, which diplomacy cannot settle, and the development through an international congress of a code of law, the League proposes, if necessary, to compel states to bring their cases before the court for investigation before going to war. The League does not propose to enforce the decisions of the court. This point is clearly brought out by President Lowell. The force to be used is not exclusively military. It may be economic, as, for example, the boycott. And the suggestion is offered that fear of the use of force may be of itself sufficient

preventive of war, and make the actual application of the proposed remedies unnecessary. Investigation of a question by a court or a council of conciliation, with a "cooling-off period" of a year or less before decision is rendered, would undoubtedly be conducive to a pacific settlement.

That the plan of the League is in many ways open to criticism, is already apparent in the discussions that have arisen in regard to it. Believers in no force at all, but in persuasion and moral methods, will of course think the plan undesirable and may predict that it will die a natural death after a short existence as propaganda. Some hard-headed pacifists who are by no means of non-resistant views, especially as to the use of force by individual nations, will reject the plan because, looking the facts in the face, they do not believe the world is ready for it. They will continue to seek the advancement of their ideals through what to them is the historical and logical development—that is, the Hague Conferences and the establishment of a truly permanent court without police or boycott. They will urge that widespread international education in respect for law and order together with the cultivation of friendly relations should be stressed and the question of force avoided, lest it delay progress. Believers in a world-state, not as at present possible, but ultimately desirable, who may accept force in principle, but differ as to the method by which it should be operated, may regret that the plan of the League is confederate rather than federal—that is, that it contemplates an association of governments and not a union of peoples. They will say that the League does not go far enough; though they may welcome it as a start in the right direction. They would like to see a definite programme of international government adopted by the peace movement, a government with executive, legislative and judicial departments, with checks and balances on one another, and especially upon the military power, which, should be under popular control and beyond the abuse of despotic rulers. As essential to federation, they would also ask for a limitation of national armaments, the cessation of national conquests, and a new economic adjustment of trade conditions, including the removal when possible of tariff barriers. They might also question whether the League could carry out its purposes of enforcement and pay its bills without a scheme of federal taxation, in which possibly the citizen rather than the national state should be levied upon, as might be the case in a federation of peoples, though not in a mere association of governments as a confederation. Some critics who view the question from the standpoint of the United States may say that the logical result of the ideas of the League would be to destroy the Monroe Doctrine; that it would be to bring the United States into the European balance of power, and lead our people into war sooner than if we held aloof; and that in any case the United States Senate before which the project would have to come would never approve it, or would not do so at present.

To all these questions and many more that may be brought up, it will be the business of the League to find an answer. In fact, it is already through its enthusiastic supporters, Ex-President Taft, President Lowell, Professor Clark, Mr. Marburg and Mr. Holt, dealing with them courageously. And while these men and

others who desire to see something accomplished are speaking, as it were, a new message to us, let us try to see the whole problem in a large way. Whatever the defects of the League's proposals, the discussions that its programme will excite will enable our people and, let us hope, the people of other countries, to see more clearly

than ever before the true nature of the political foundations of a right international order—the end to which we are all working, or should be working, whatever may be our differences as to matters of form or detail. Let there be new work together all along the line.

## IS THERE DANGER OF A JAPANESE INVASION?

By HENRY LOOMIS (Yokohama)

**T**HERE have been frequent and strong assertions that there is such a probability of a war between Japan and the United States that to prepare as speedily as possible for any emergency is an urgent necessity. Such an event is so utterly impossible that it is not worthy of serious consideration. And the reasons are these:

There is no such disposition on the part of the Japanese people. Some irresponsible jingoes may try to stir up trouble, but they do not represent the thinking and ruling classes. Writing on this subject, the editor of the *Japan Mail* (who was an ex-officer in the British army) said: "Before engaging in a war with America Japan would have to divest herself of the strongest sentiments of friendship which are entertained towards any foreign country."

The Hon. Shimada Saburo, the editor of a leading daily paper in Tokyo, and one of the most prominent men in the Diet and politics, writes: "These rumors that Japan may attack and occupy the Pacific coast are absolutely without any foundation in fact, and will be proved baseless in time. Such an attack would be suicidal. The United States is the greatest buyer of Japanese goods, and she does not propose to ruin all this trade by making a foolish attack that would be foredoomed to failure."

In an editorial in the *Japan Advertiser* (which is owned and edited by an American in Tokyo) the writer says: "To suppose or to pretend to suppose, that the leaders of the Japanese people contemplate a war with a non-military but extremely powerful nation, containing double the population and tenfold the resources of Japan, and separated from Japan's bases by 4,000 to 6,000 miles of sea, is to pay a very bad compliment to the political sagacity which has made Japan the power that she is. War with America on any pretext whatever is unthinkable. No government could propose it and live a day."

At a meeting of the leading American residents of all professions in the city of Yokohama, the American Ambassador said: "There is no cause under the sun why there should be distrust between the people of Japan and America. I think that the idea that Japan is a blood-thirsty nation that wants territory and war with the United States is being gradually worn out, and the idea of suspecting our neighbors will be a thing of the past."

The following is an extract from the resolutions that were unanimously adopted at the same meeting:

"It has come to our knowledge that in sections of the United States rumors have been circulated to the effect that public sentiment in Japan is hostile to the United

States, and that the Japanese government entertains sinister purposes of a dangerous character.

"The rumors in question are based upon misinformation, or, even worse, the hope of selfish advantage. We believe, upon evidence that cannot be doubted, there is not to be found in the Japanese Empire any wish or thought other than to maintain the most friendly and cordial relations with the Republic of the United States, and that any representations to the contrary, wherever emanating, and from whatever cause proceeding, are baseless calumnies, which, if uncontradicted, can only result in vast material losses to the people of both governments, and creating an unhappy prejudice between them."

The war between Japan and China, and also the one with Russia, were not brought about by Japan's seeking. Had either China or Russia been willing to accept reasonable terms of adjusting differences which had arisen in the administration of affairs in Korea, the whole trouble would have been settled without resort to arms.

Should there be any change of feeling at this time, or in the future, on the part of the Japanese towards the United States, such a thing as a war is impossible for the following reasons:

The whole area of Japan proper is less than that of the State of California, and only one-fourth, or less than the area of New York State alone, is under cultivation.

The wealth of Japan is only one-half of that of the State of New York.

The total population of Japan is about 60,000,000, and that of the United States 111,000,000, which is slightly more than one-half.

The national debt of Japan is greater than that of the United States, and more than one-half of this sum is money borrowed from abroad. Her wealth is less than one-twelfth that of the United States.

The annual income of the Japanese is \$30 per capita. The annual income of residents of the United States is \$250.

Less than one per cent of the farmers in Japan own 25 acres, and ninety per cent less than one acre. The rent is often sixty per cent of the crop, and the average peasant must pay as much as 20 per cent interest.

The ordinary taxes amount to about ten per cent of the income, and to this is added the special income tax, which runs from  $1\frac{7}{10}$  to  $26\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

No other country in the world is carrying so heavy a financial burden in proportion to its strength. The